Abstract
This paper addresses the role that foreign vs. domestic ownership of companies plays for governments in asymmetric countries' competition for a multinational's subsidiary. I argue that equilibrium subsidies as well as a foreign investor's location decision in policy competition between these countries critically depend on the ownership structure of incumbent firms. This shows that small countries with few national incumbents in an industry may be successful in attracting multinationals.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Subsidy competition, foreign direct investment, regional location |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Wirtschaftspolitik |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | F12, F23, H25, L13 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2031-4 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 2031 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 19. Sep. 2007 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 05. Nov. 2020, 06:06 |