Abstract
This paper addresses the role that foreign vs. domestic ownership of companies plays for governments in asymmetric countries' competition for a multinational's subsidiary. I argue that equilibrium subsidies as well as a foreign investor's location decision in policy competition between these countries critically depend on the ownership structure of incumbent firms. This shows that small countries with few national incumbents in an industry may be successful in attracting multinationals.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Subsidy competition, foreign direct investment, regional location |
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Economic Policy |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | F12, F23, H25, L13 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2031-4 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 2031 |
| Date Deposited: | 19. Sep 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 05. Nov 2020 06:06 |
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