
Abstract
The paper analyzes the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take place in the region in the absence of coordination, this measure can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalizing all of the union�s benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated policy attracts more investment than when member states act in isolation. Consequently, tax levels may rise or fall under regional coordination.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 20407 |
| Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014 08:59 |
| Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:17 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 08:59) [Currently Displayed]
