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Abstract
This paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated corporate income tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain. First, for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination, a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalising all of the union’s benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare-enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation. Depending on which motive dominates, tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | tax competition, regional coordination, foreign direct investment |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Economic Policy Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Public Finance Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | F15, H73, H87 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-61-5 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 61 |
Date Deposited: | 13. Apr 2005 |
Last Modified: | 07. Nov 2020, 23:15 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment. (deposited 15. Apr 2014, 08:59)
- Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment. (deposited 13. Apr 2005) [Currently Displayed]