This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
In many situations, governments have sector-specific tax and regulation policies at their disposal to influence the market outcome after a national or an international merger has taken place. In this paper we study the implications for merger policy when countries non-cooperatively deploy production-based taxes and firms may be partly owned by foreigners. We find that when foreign firm ownership is low in the pre-merger situation, non-cooperative tax policies are more efficient after a national merger, and smaller synergy effects are needed for this type of merger to be proposed and cleared. In contrast, cross-border mergers dominate when the degree of foreign firm ownership is high initially. These results suggest a link between increasing international portfolio diversification and the rising share of cross-border mergers.
Item Type: | Journal article |
---|---|
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 20413 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014, 08:59 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:01 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Merger Policy and Tax Competition. (deposited 22. Nov 2007, 07:36)
- Merger policy and tax competition: The role of foreign firm ownership. (deposited 15. Apr 2014, 08:59) [Currently Displayed]