Metacognition and Indicative Conditionals: A Precis

Leitgeb, Hannes (2012): Metacognition and Indicative Conditionals: A Precis. In: Beran, Michael; Brandl, Johannes; Perner, Josef and Proust, Joëlle (eds.) : Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 252-266

Abstract

This chapter defends the thesis that accepting an indicative conditional is a metacognitive process that is not metarepresentational. The argument that we give in favour of this thesis is based on (1) the suppositional theory of conditionals, (2) David Lewis’ triviality result on probabilities of conditionals, and (3) Joelle Proust’s account of metacognition. The chapter ends with a list of open questions that we aim to turn to in a more comprehensive study of metacognition and conditionals.

• Item Type: Book Section
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP); Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Mind
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy; 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 150 Psychology
• ISBN: 9780199646739
• Place of Publication: Oxford
• Language: English