Lyon, Aidan (2012): Mathematical Explanations of Empirical Facts, and Mathematical Realism. In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 3: pp. 559-578 |

### Abstract

A main thread of the debate over mathematical realism has come down to whether mathematics does explanatory work of its own in some of our best scientific explanations of empirical facts. Realists argue that it does; anti-realists argue that it doesn't. Part of this debate depends on how mathematics might be able to do explanatory work in an explanation. Everyone agrees that it's not enough that there merely be some mathematics in the explanation. Anti-realists claim there is nothing mathematics can do to make an explanation mathematical; realists think something can be done, but they are not clear about what that something is. I argue that many of the examples of mathematical explanations of empirical facts in the literature can be accounted for in terms of Jackson and Pettit's 1990 notion of program explanation, and that mathematical realists can use the notion of program explanation to support their realism. This is exactly what has happened in a recent thread of the debate over moral realism (in this journal). I explain how the two debates are analogous and how moves that have been made in the moral realism debate can be made in the mathematical realism debate. However, I conclude that one can be a mathematical realist without having to be a moral realist.

Item Type: | Article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Philosophy of Mathematics |

Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |

ISSN: | 0004-8402 |

Language: | English |

ID Code: | 21051 |

Deposited On: | 03. Jul 2014 06:45 |

Last Modified: | 29. Apr 2016 09:18 |