Abstract
This paper studies the relation between discrete-time and continuoustime principal-agent models. We derive the continuous-time model as a limit of discretetime models with ever shorter periods and show that optimal incentive schemes in the discrete-time models approximate the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous model, which is linear in accounts. Under the additional assumption that the principal observes only cumulative total profits at the end and the agent can destroy profits unnoticed, an incentive scheme that is linear in total profits is shown to be approximately optimal in the discrete-time model when the length of the period is small.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Principal-agent problems ; linear incentive schemes ; intertemporal incentive provision ; Brownian motion |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Micro-Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrial Organization Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Economics of Information Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Theory |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | C61 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-22-9 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 22 |
Date Deposited: | 13. Apr 2005 |
Last Modified: | 05. Nov 2020, 14:45 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision. (deposited 13. Apr 2005) [Currently Displayed]