Bidding in hierarchies

Konrad, Kai A. (2004): Bidding in hierarchies. In: European Economic Review, Bd. 48, Nr. 6: S. 1301-1308

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Publikationsform: Publisher's Version
• Keywords: hierarchical system
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D72, D74
• ISSN: 0014-2921
• Sprache: Englisch