
Abstract
This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Contest; hierarchies; rent dissipation |
Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D72, D74 |
ISSN: | 0722-6748 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24403 |
Date Deposited: | 30. Mar 2015, 10:41 |
Last Modified: | 03. Mar 2017, 10:54 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Bidding in hierarchies. (deposited 30. Mar 2015, 10:41) [Currently Displayed]