| Konrad, Kai A. (2004): Bidding in hierarchies. In: European Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 6: pp. 1301-1308 |
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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
| Keywords: | hierarchical system |
| Faculties: | Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D72, D74 |
| ISSN: | 0014-2921 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 22108 |
| Deposited On: | 09. Dec 2014 09:27 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:02 |
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Bidding in hierarchies. (deposited 30. Mar 2015 10:41)
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