|Konrad, Kai A. (2004): Bidding in hierarchies. In: European Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 6: pp. 1301-1308|
This is the latest version of this item.
This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
|Faculties:||Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance|
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||D72, D74|
|Deposited On:||09. Dec 2014 09:27|
|Last Modified:||30. Mar 2015 10:49|
Available Versions of this Item
Bidding in hierarchies. (deposited 30. Mar 2015 10:41)
- Bidding in hierarchies. (deposited 09. Dec 2014 09:27) [Currently Displayed]