Abstract
This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Contest; hierarchies; rent dissipation |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > MPI für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D72, D74 |
ISSN: | 0722-6748 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 24403 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 30. Mrz. 2015, 10:41 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 03. Mrz. 2017, 10:54 |
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- Bidding in hierarchies. (deposited 30. Mrz. 2015, 10:41) [momentan angezeigt]