Who goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting

Wagner, Peter (4. Mai 2015): Who goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 500

Abstract

This paper considers a "war of attrition" game in which agents learn about an uncertain state of the world through private signals and from their peers. I provide existence and uniqueness results for a class of equilibria that satisfy a "full-participation" condition, and show that asymmetries in the distribution of information can lead to excessive stopping and an oversupply of information relative to the social optimum.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Fakultät: Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics ; Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

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