Abstract
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators’ licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost reduction, and even negative royalty rates.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
---|---|
Keywords: | Innovation, licensing, industrial organization. |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D21, D43, D44, D45 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24906-7 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 24906 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 23. Jun. 2015, 09:31 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 13:06 |