
Abstract
The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators’ licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost reduction, and even negative royalty rates.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Innovation, licensing, industrial organization. |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D21, D43, D44, D45 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24906-7 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 24906 |
Date Deposited: | 23. Jun 2015, 09:31 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:06 |