Abstract
Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is complicated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference estimations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a signifcant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Publikationsform: | Submitted Version |
Keywords: | Ballot access, Petition requirements, Electoral competition, Natural experiment |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Neue politische Ökonomie |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D72, D78 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2922-7 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 2922 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 02. Apr. 2008, 11:49 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 20:00 |