
Abstract
Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is complicated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference estimations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a signifcant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Item Type: | Paper |
---|---|
Form of publication: | Submitted Version |
Keywords: | Ballot access, Petition requirements, Electoral competition, Natural experiment |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Public Choice |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D72, D78 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2922-7 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 2922 |
Date Deposited: | 02. Apr 2008, 11:49 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 20:00 |