Abstract
International organizations promote privatization as precondition for economic development. But is there really too little privatization? This political economy model asks for the incentives of governments to privatize or restructure a state-owned firm. Different government types are compared to identify the political and institutional determinants of privatization. Under privatization, governments commit not to influence the profit-maximizing employment choice by private investors. With respect to the social optimum, both voter-oriented and egoistic governments can have inefficiently high incentives to privatize. When this is the case, outside pressure to privatize is detrimental. An improving institutional environment reduces these inefficiencies.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | political incentives ; privatization ; restructuring ; employment |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Neue politische Ökonomie Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Komparative Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D72, D73, H82, L33 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-296-1 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 296 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 13. Apr. 2005 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 05. Nov. 2020, 07:03 |