Abstract
This article investigates best-price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game. Best-price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase. Two different price clauses are distinguished: "most favored customer" and "meet or release." I examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite-horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods. In each period, new consumers enter the market. I show that in this context, meet-or-release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most-favored-customer clauses.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Keywords: | Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; Monopolistic Competition; Contestable Markets; Market Structure: Industrial Organization and Corporate Strategy; Microeconomics Theory of Firm and Industry under Imperfectly Competitive Market Structures |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Komparative Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-3108-6 |
ISSN: | 1756-2171; 0741-6261 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 3108 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 08. Apr. 2008, 08:57 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 25. Jan. 2019, 18:24 |