
Abstract
This article investigates best-price clauses as a strategic devise to facilitate collusion in a dynamic duopoly game. Best-price clauses guarantee rebates on the purchase price if a customer finds a better price after his purchase. Two different price clauses are distinguished: "most favored customer" and "meet or release." I examine the collusive potential of both clauses in a finite-horizon duopoly model with homogeneous durable goods. In each period, new consumers enter the market. I show that in this context, meet-or-release clauses have a greater anticompetitive potential than most-favored-customer clauses.
Item Type: | Journal article |
---|---|
Keywords: | Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; Monopolistic Competition; Contestable Markets; Market Structure: Industrial Organization and Corporate Strategy; Microeconomics Theory of Firm and Industry under Imperfectly Competitive Market Structures |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Comparative Economics |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-3108-6 |
ISSN: | 1756-2171; 0741-6261 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 3108 |
Date Deposited: | 08. Apr 2008, 08:57 |
Last Modified: | 25. Jan 2019, 18:24 |