Abstract
The paper develops a simple theoretical framework in which the impact of different governance structures on management incentives, the efficiency of restructuring, and the social costs of the adjustment process in the transition period in Eastern Europe can be analyzed. The model shows that immediate privatization leads not only to strong management incentives to restructure but also to high social costs of bankruptcies and layoffs. If the government stays in control social costs will be lower. However, in this case managers face a soft budget constraint and have less incentive to restructure. The model also suggests which companies should be privatized first. J. Comp. Econom., June 1993, 17(2), pp 964-287. University of Bonn, D-531 13 Bonn, Germany
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftstheorie
Volkswirtschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Komparative Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-3400-8 |
ISSN: | 0147-5967 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 3400 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 22. Apr. 2008, 12:40 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:47 |