Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments

Hillinger, Claude (June 2004): Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments. Discussion Papers in Economics 2004-9

Abstract

The paper elaborates the idea that voting is an instance of the aggregation of judgments, this being a more general concept than the aggregation of preferences. To aggregate judgments one must first measure them. I show that such aggregation has been unproblematic whenever it has been based on an independent and unrestricted scale. The scales analyzed in voting theory are either context dependent or subject to unreasonable restrictions. This is the real source of the diverse 'paradoxes of voting' that would better be termed 'voting pathologies'. The theory leads me to advocate what I term evaluative voting. It can also be called utilitarian voting as it is based on having voters express their cardinal preferences. The alternative that maximizes the sum wins. This proposal operationalizes, in an election context, the abstract cardinal theories of collective choice due to Fleming and Harsanyi. On pragmatic grounds, I argue for a three valued scale for general elections.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: approval voting, cardinal utility, instant runoff voting, plurality voting, voting paradoxes
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Public Choice; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Welfare Economics; Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Mathematical Economics (closed)
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology; 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D71, D72
• Language: English