Abstract
Abstract: Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. We study how business groups can substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. In a two period model, there is no contract enforcement in the first period. The firms within the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure, resulting in externalities due to double marginalization, and an internal capital market. Our model derives the sequencing of investments and the credit contract offered by the headquarters that solve the ex post moral hazard problem. Thus, the business group's organizational mode and the financial structure facilitate relational contracting.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Business groups, internal capital market, institutions |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Komparative Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | G21, K49, L22 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-387-0 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 387 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 13. Apr. 2005 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 08. Nov. 2020, 06:30 |