Abstract
Abstract: Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. We study how business groups can substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. In a two period model, there is no contract enforcement in the first period. The firms within the business group are connected to each other by a vertical production structure, resulting in externalities due to double marginalization, and an internal capital market. Our model derives the sequencing of investments and the credit contract offered by the headquarters that solve the ex post moral hazard problem. Thus, the business group's organizational mode and the financial structure facilitate relational contracting.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | Business groups, internal capital market, institutions |
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Comparative Economics |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | G21, K49, L22 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-387-0 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 387 |
| Date Deposited: | 13. Apr 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 08. Nov 2020 06:30 |

