Abstract
Self-reference has played a prominent role in the development of metamathematics in the past century, starting with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. Given the nature of this and other results in the area, the informal understanding of self-reference in arithmetic has sufficed so far. Recently, however, it has been argued that for other related issues in metamathematics and philosophical logic a precise notion of self-reference and, more generally, reference is actually required. These notions have been so far elusive and are surrounded by an aura of scepticism that has kept most philosophers away. In this paper I suggest we shouldn’t give up all hope. First, I introduce the reader to these issues. Second, I discuss the conditions a good notion of reference in arithmetic must satisfy. Accordingly, I then introduce adequate notions of reference for the language of first-order arithmetic, which I show to be fruitful for addressing the aforementioned issues in metamathematics.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
---|---|
Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 160 Logik |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-42199-3 |
Allianz-/Nationallizenz: | Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich. |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 42199 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 22. Jan. 2018 18:47 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020 13:17 |