Abstract
One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called `infinite conjunctions'. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational (transparent), which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with a truth predicate and argue that they fail to support the necessity of transparency for that purpose. Second, we show that, with the aid of some regimentation, many expressive functions of the truth predicate can actually be performed using truth principles that are consistent in classical logic. Finally, we suggest a reconceptualisation of deflationism, according to which the principles that govern the use of the truth predicate in natural language are largely irrelevant for the question of what formal theory of truth we should adopt. Many philosophers think that the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationists; we will argue, on the contrary, that deflationists are in a much better position to deal with the paradoxes than their opponents.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Form of publication: | Publisher's Version |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP) > Logic |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-42200-1 |
ISSN: | 1572-8420 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 42200 |
Date Deposited: | 20. Feb 2018, 07:23 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 13:17 |