The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies

Forster, Josef (25. July 2008): The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies. Discussion Papers in Economics 2008-14

Abstract

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) very often have been criticized for announcing inaccurate credit ratings and are suspected of being exposed to conflicts of interest. Despite these objections CRAs remained largely unregulated. Based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), we study the optimal regulation of CRAs in a model where rating quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The model shows that minimum rating standards increase the social value of credit ratings. The model also analyzes implications for regulation in the presence of conflicts of interest between the CRA and the rated clients by direct bribes and by the joint provision of rating and consulting services.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: credit rating agencies, regulation, conflicts of interest
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Financial Markets
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology; 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: G20, G24, G28
• Language: English