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Forges, Françoise und Horst, Ulrich (2017): Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 17 [PDF, 321kB]

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Abstract

We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent ("talk and cooperate equilibrium", TCE). We establish that a TCE exists provided that the receiver has a "uniform punishment decision" (UPD) against the sender.

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