Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation

Forges, Françoise und Horst, Ulrich (2017): Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation. Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Discussion Paper No. 17

Abstract

We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent ("talk and cooperate equilibrium", TCE). We establish that a TCE exists provided that the receiver has a "uniform punishment decision" (UPD) against the sender.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: sender-receiver game; commitment; cooperative solution; individual rationality
• Faculties: Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition"
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C72, C65
• Language: English