Abstract
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Form of publication: | Preprint |
| Keywords: | additive preferences; coalition formation; computational complexity; hedonic games; NP-hard; NP-complete |
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Micro-Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Mathematical Methods Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Game Theory |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C63, C70, C71 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-6430-0 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 6430 |
| Date Deposited: | 10. Oct 2008 16:09 |
| Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 20:54 |
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