Abstract
We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | merger policy; international trade |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrieökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftspolitik |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | L41, F13, H77 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-666-9 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 666 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 20. Jul. 2005 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 06. Nov. 2020, 20:44 |