Abstract
We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | merger policy; international trade |
| Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrial Organization Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | L41, F13, H77 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-666-9 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 666 |
| Date Deposited: | 20. Jul 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 06. Nov 2020 20:44 |

