Abstract
We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | merger policy; international trade |
Faculties: | Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrial Organization Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Policy |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | L41, F13, H77 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-666-9 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 666 |
Date Deposited: | 20. Jul 2005 |
Last Modified: | 06. Nov 2020, 20:44 |