Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze Schelling's compatibilist account of freedom of the will particularly in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809). I shall argue that against Kant's transcendental compatibilism Schelling proposes a "volitional compatibilism," according to which the free will emerges out of nature and is not identical to practical reason as Kant claims. Finally, I will relate Schelling's volitional compatibilism to more recent accounts of free will in order to better understand what he means by his concept of a "higher necessity."
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Evangelische Theologie |
Themengebiete: | 200 Religion > 200 Religion |
ISSN: | 0046-8541 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 84661 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 25. Jan. 2022, 09:11 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 25. Jan. 2022, 09:11 |