Abstract
This paper discusses how an industrialized country could defend the wages and social benefits of its unskilled workers against wage competition from immigrants. It shows that fixing social standards harms the workers and that fixing social replacement incomes implies migration into unemployment. Defending wages with replacement incomes brings about first-order efficiency losses that outweigh the budget cost to the government. By contrast, wage subsidies involve much smaller welfare losses. While the exclusion of migrants from a national replacement program does not improve the situation, the (temporary) exclusion of migrants from a national subsidy program makes it possible to avoid a distortion of the migration pattern.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Titel des Journals: | International Tax and Public Finance |
Keywords: | migration, unemployment, welfare |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Lehrstuhl für Nationalökonomie
Volkswirtschaft |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | F15, F22, I38, H5, J61 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-937-2 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 937 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 31. Mai 2006 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:45 |