Abstract
This article addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where matching is important. We compare fee-based and commission-based compensation systems and show that they are payoff equivalent if the intermediary is completely honest. Allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of remuneration on the quality of advice. The possibility of mismatching gives the intermediary substantial market power, which will not translate into mismatching if consumers are rational. Furthermore, we offer a rationale for the use of contingent commissions and address whether or not the ban of any commission payments is an appropriate market intervention.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Risikomanagement und Versicherung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 00224367 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 95194 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 22. Mrz. 2023, 10:04 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 22. Mrz. 2023, 10:04 |