Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of crowding out of insurance by co-existing governmental relief programs—the so-called ‘charity hazard’—in the context of different institutional schemes of governmental disaster relief in Austria and Germany. We test empirically whether an assured partial relief scheme (as in Austria) drives a stronger crowding out of private insurance than a scheme promising full relief which is subject to ad-hoc political decision making (as in Germany). Our general finding is that the institutional design of governmental relief programs significantly affects the demand for private natural hazard insurance.
| Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
|---|---|
| Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Risikomanagement und Versicherung |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| ISSN: | 0924-6460 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 95573 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 31. Mrz. 2023 14:24 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 31. Mrz. 2023 14:24 |
