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Raschky, Paul A.; Schwarze, Reimund; Schwindt, Manijeh und Zahn, Ferdinand (2013): Uncertainty of Governmental Relief and the Crowding out of Flood Insurance. In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Bd. 54, Nr. 2: S. 179-200

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Abstract

This paper discusses the problem of crowding out of insurance by co-existing governmental relief programs—the so-called ‘charity hazard’—in the context of different institutional schemes of governmental disaster relief in Austria and Germany. We test empirically whether an assured partial relief scheme (as in Austria) drives a stronger crowding out of private insurance than a scheme promising full relief which is subject to ad-hoc political decision making (as in Germany). Our general finding is that the institutional design of governmental relief programs significantly affects the demand for private natural hazard insurance.

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