Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of crowding out of insurance by co-existing governmental relief programs—the so-called ‘charity hazard’—in the context of different institutional schemes of governmental disaster relief in Austria and Germany. We test empirically whether an assured partial relief scheme (as in Austria) drives a stronger crowding out of private insurance than a scheme promising full relief which is subject to ad-hoc political decision making (as in Germany). Our general finding is that the institutional design of governmental relief programs significantly affects the demand for private natural hazard insurance.
| Item Type: | Journal article |
|---|---|
| Faculties: | Munich School of Management > Institute for Risk Management and Insurance |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| ISSN: | 0924-6460 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 95573 |
| Date Deposited: | 31. Mar 2023 14:24 |
| Last Modified: | 31. Mar 2023 14:24 |
