Endogenous Information and Adverse Selection under Loss Prevention

Peter, Richard; Richter, Andreas und Thistle, Paul (November 2013): Endogenous Information and Adverse Selection under Loss Prevention.

Abstract

We examine the endogenous value of information in an insurance market with potential adverse selection in the efficiency of prevention technology. By introducing observable preventive effort for all risk types classification risk might be overcome: If decision-makers adjust their prevention behavior to the information acquired, information might be valuable. Consequently, a first-best efficient risk allocation does not necessarily deter information acquisition. Allowing for prevention does not change the ordering of the value of information across disclosure regimes compared to a situation without prevention. This has important policy implications for the areas of genetic testing, HIV testing and product liability.

• Dokumententyp: Paper
• Keywords: information value, loss prevention, adverse selection
• Fakultät: Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Risikomanagement und Versicherung
• Themengebiete: 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft
• JEL Classification: D11, D82, G22, G28
• Sprache: Englisch