Abstract
For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In particular we ask how (1) market entry and (2) public investments in the public good affects the firms' production and profits. Surprisingly, we find that there exist cases where incumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show the counter-intuitive result that public spending does not necessarily lead to a decreasing voluntary private contribution.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Open Source Software, Private Provision of Public Goods, Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, Complements, Market Entry |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrieökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Komparative Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C72, L13, L86 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-964-1 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 964 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 25. Jun. 2006 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 05. Nov. 2020, 04:53 |