WHY GOD THINKS WHAT HE IS THINKING? AN ARGUMENT AGAINST SAMUEL NEWLANDS' BRUTE-FACT-THEORY OF DIVINE IDEAS IN LEIBNIZ'S METAPHYSICS

Propach, Jan Levin (2021): WHY GOD THINKS WHAT HE IS THINKING? AN ARGUMENT AGAINST SAMUEL NEWLANDS' BRUTE-FACT-THEORY OF DIVINE IDEAS IN LEIBNIZ'S METAPHYSICS. In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Bd. 13, Nr. 3: S. 171-185

Abstract

According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz's metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Katholische Theologie
• Themengebiete: 200 Religion > 200 Religion
• ISSN: 1689-8311
• Sprache: Englisch