Abstract
Platforms operators act as private regulators to increase usage and maximize profits. Their goals depend on the development of the platform: overcoming the chicken-egg problem early on requires attracting platform participants while quality becomes more important later on. Private regulators influence third-party business models, entry barriers, and usage intensity. We analyze how drivers of usage intensity on Facebook’s application platform were affected by a policy change that increased quality incentives for applications. This change led to the number of installations of each application becoming less important, applications in more concentrated sub-markets achieving higher usage, and applications staying attractive for longer.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Publikationsform: | Preprint |
Keywords: | private regulation multi-sided platforms usage intensity |
Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft
Betriebswirtschaft > Diskussionsbeiträge Betriebswirtschaft > Diskussionsbeiträge > Communication Economics |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | L1, L50, O33 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-11374-6 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 11374 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 12. Mai 2010, 12:57 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:52 |
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- Private Regulation by Platform Operators – Implications for Usage Intensity. (deposited 12. Mai 2010, 12:57) [momentan angezeigt]