
Abstract
Im Mainstream traditioneller Erkenntnistheorien der Neuzeit kommt das erkennende Subjekt tendenziell nur über seine epistemischen Tätigkeiten in den Blick. Diese Abstraktion wird der erkenntnistheoretischen Aufgabe, das Erkennen zu erkennen, nicht gerecht. Erfordert wäre eine Erkenntnistheorie, die auch die nicht-epistemischen Tätigkeiten des Subjekts als integrale Komponente jeder Erkenntnisrelation begreift.
Abstract
Within the mainstream of traditional theories of cognition in modern philosophy, the cognizing subject tends to be regarded only in the light of its epistemic activities. This abstraction doesn’t do justice to the cognition-theoretical task of cognizing cognition. There is need for a theory of cognition that understands the non-epistemic activities of the subject as an integral component of every cognitional relation.
Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Speech) |
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Keywords: | Philosophie, Erkenntnistheorie, Kant, Locke, Hume, Descartes, philosophy, cognition, epistemology, Kant, Locke, Hume, Descartes |
Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy > Epistemology |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 120 Epistemology |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-12574-2 |
Language: | German |
Item ID: | 12574 |
Date Deposited: | 03. Jan 2012, 11:10 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |