Not Quite Intuitionism

Pietz, Andreas (12. September 2011): Not Quite Intuitionism. XXII. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 11. - 15. September 2011.

Abstract

This is an investigation of M. Dummett's claim that a theory of meaning based on verification conditions should lead to the abandonment of classical logic in favor of intuitionistic logic. I especially concentrate on his suggestion that, in order to give the meaning of negations and conditionals, we should also take on board falsification conditions. Taken seriously, however, this route takes us not to intuitionistic logic, but rather to one of the Nelson logics.

• Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Speech)
• Keywords: Verificationism, Dummett, Logical Revision, Constructive Logic, Nelson Logic
• Faculties: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy; Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science > XXII. German Congress of Philosophy > Logics
• Subjects: 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic
• Language: English

References

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[3] E. López-Escobar. Constructions and negationless logic. Studia Logica, 30 (1):7–19, 1972.

[4] D. Nelson. Constructible falsity. Journal of Symbolic logic, 14/1:16–26, 1949. 5

[5] S. Odintsov. Constructive negations and paraconsistency. Springer Verlag, 2008.

[6] H. Wansing. The Logic of Information Structures. Lecture Notes in AI 681. Springer Verlag, 1993.

[7] H. Wansing. Displaying Modal Logic. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.