Abstract
We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes decline, switching from positive to negative levels, and then rise as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | tax and subsidy competition, oligopolistic markets |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Finanzwissenschaft Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Wirtschaftspolitik |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | H25, H73, F15 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-1399-9 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 1399 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 02. Apr. 2007 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 08. Nov. 2020, 11:12 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
- Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay? (deposited 02. Apr. 2007) [momentan angezeigt]