Abstract
We devise a new experimental game by nesting a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. With it, we study tensions between egalitarianism, equity concerns, self-interest, and the need for incentives. In a 2x2 design, subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal incomes that are either task-determined or random. We find subjects' voting to be mainly self-interested but also influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, which sometimes cut in opposite directions. Contributions, which seem mainly determined by boundedly rational responses to incentives, are influenced by egalitarian, equity and strategic considerations.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C91, C92, D31, D63, H41 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 18171 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 06. Feb. 2014, 15:28 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 23. Aug. 2017, 13:30 |
Alle Versionen dieses Dokumentes
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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb. 2014, 15:28)
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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb. 2014, 15:29)
- Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment. (deposited 06. Feb. 2014, 15:28) [momentan angezeigt]
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Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment. (deposited 06. Feb. 2014, 15:29)