ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-0828
(2012):
Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs.
In: American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 2: pp. 834-864
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
High-performance work systems give workers more discretion, thereby increasing effort productivity but also shirking opportunities. We show experimentally that screening for work attitude and labor market competition are causal determinants of the viability of high-performance work systems, and we identify the complementarities between discretion, rent-sharing, and screening that render them profitable. Two fundamentally distinct job designs emerge endogenously in our experiments: \"bad\" jobs with low discretion, low wages, and little rent-sharing, and \"good\" jobs with high discretion, high wages, and substantial rent-sharing. Good jobs are profitable only if employees can be screened, and labor market competition fosters their dissemination.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Economics Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Economic Theory |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 20128 |
Date Deposited: | 15. Apr 2014 08:56 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020 13:01 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design. (deposited 18. Jan 2010 21:11)
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs. (deposited 10. Jul 2012 13:07)
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 09:00)
- Screening, competition, and job design: Economic origins of good jobs. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 08:56) [Currently Displayed]
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs. (deposited 15. Apr 2014 09:00)
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs. (deposited 10. Jul 2012 13:07)