Price Dispersion and Learning in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly

Keller, Godfrey and Rady, Sven (April 2001): Price Dispersion and Learning in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly. Discussion Papers in Economics 2001-10 RAND Journal of Economics, 34

Abstract

We study the evolution of prices set by duopolists who are uncertain about the perceived degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes view the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. As the informativeness of the quantities sold increases with the price differential, there is scope for active learning by firms. When information has low value to the firms, they charge the same price as would be set by myopic players, and there is no price dispersion. When firms value information more highly, on the other hand, they actively learn by creating price dispersion. Such price dispersion arises in a cyclical fashion, and is most likely to be observed when the firms' environment changes sufficiently often, but not too frequently. Firms' payoffs are higher when they use correlated pricing strategies. Contrary to what one might expect, such coordination need not hurt consumers, provided they are sufficiently impatient.

• Item Type: Paper
• Keywords: Duopoly Experimentation ; Bayesian Learning ; Stochastic Differential Game ; Markov Perfect Equilibrium ; Mixed Strategies ; Correlated Equilibrium
• Faculties: Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Micro-Economics; Economics > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrial Organization; Economics > Chairs > Chair of Dynamic Economic Theory (closed)
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology; 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C73, D43, D83
• Language: English