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Abstract
Microfinance is typically associated with joint liability of group members. However, a large part of microfinance institutions rather offers individual instead of group loans. We analyze the incentive mechanisms in both individual and group contracts. Moreover, we show that microfinance institutions offer group loans when the loan size is rather large, refinancing costs are high, and competition between microfinance institutions is low. Otherwise, individual loans are offered. Interestingly, our analysis predicts that individual lending in microfinance will gain in importance in the future if microfinance institutions continue to get better access to capital markets and if competition further rises.
| Dokumententyp: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Publikationsform: | Submitted Version |
| Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft
Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrieökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Finanzmärkte Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Entwicklungsökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics > Transformationsökonomik Volkswirtschaft > Lehrstühle > Seminar für Komparative Wirtschaftsforschung |
| Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 300 Sozialwissenschaft, Soziologie
300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
| JEL Classification: | F37, G21, G34, L13, O16 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-7486-4 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Dokumenten ID: | 7486 |
| Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 18. Nov. 2008, 09:09 |
| Letzte Änderungen: | 05. Nov. 2020, 16:35 |
| Literaturliste: | microfinance, group lending, individual lending |
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