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Sterkenburg, Tom F. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4860-727X
(27. November 2024):
Statistical Learning Theory and Occam’s Razor: The Core Argument.
In: Minds and Machines, Bd. 35, 3
[PDF, 1MB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4860-727X
(27. November 2024):
Statistical Learning Theory and Occam’s Razor: The Core Argument.
In: Minds and Machines, Bd. 35, 3
[PDF, 1MB]
Sterkenburg, Tom F. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4860-727X
(2023):
Commentary on David Watson, “On the Philosophy of Unsupervised Learning,” Philosophy & Technology.
In: Philosophy & Technology, Bd. 36, Nr. 4, 63
[PDF, 567kB]
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4860-727X
(2023):
Commentary on David Watson, “On the Philosophy of Unsupervised Learning,” Philosophy & Technology.
In: Philosophy & Technology, Bd. 36, Nr. 4, 63
[PDF, 567kB]
Sterkenburg, Tom F. und Heide, Rianne de
(2022):
On the truth-convergence of open-minded Bayesianism.
In: Review of Symbolic Logic, Bd. 15, Nr. 1: S. 64-100
[PDF, 525kB]
Stewart, Rush T. und Sterkenburg, Tom F.
(2022):
Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.
In: Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society, Bd. 58, Nr. 2: S. 138-166
Sterkenburg, Tom F. und Grunwald, Peter D.
(2021):
The no-free-lunch theorems of supervised learning.
In: Synthese, Bd. 199, Nr. 3-4: S. 9979-10015
Sterkenburg, Tom F.
(2020):
THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION.
In: Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology, Bd. 17, Nr. 4, PII S1742360018000527: S. 519-541
Sterkenburg, Tom F.
(2020):
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: How to Get Beyond the Statistics Wars.
In: Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Bd. 51, Nr. 3: S. 507-510
Sterkenburg, Tom F.
(2019):
The Metainductive Justification of Induction: The Pool of Strategies.
In: Philosophy of Science, Bd. 86, Nr. 5: S. 981-992
Sterkenburg, Tom F.
(2019):
Putnam's Diagonal Argument and the Impossibility of a Universal Learning Machine.
In: Erkenntnis, Bd. 84, Nr. 3: S. 633-656